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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHESTER WILLIAM WRIGHT, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8615 
From the admitted allegations of the complaint and 
from the statements of counsel at pretrial of the evidence 
he would introduce in behalf of his claim, plaintiff pre-
sented the following facts: That a collision occurred on 
January 26, 1955, at approximately 8:35 P. M. at the inter-
section of Main Street and Robert Avenue in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, between automobiles driven by the plaintiff 
Wright, a highway patrolman, and the defendant's employee 
Lambert; that immediately before the collision, the plain-
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2 
tiff was proceeding north on Main Street in the outside 
lane, that is, the lane nearest the east curb, at a speed which 
he estimated at 30 to 35 miles per hour; that when Wright 
was 90 feet away from the intersection he, for the first 
time, observed defendant's automobile entering the inter-
section and applied his brakes, but because of an icy por-
tion on the street not observed by him, the brakes failed to 
hold and the car spun around from the outside lane closer 
to the center of the road and crashed into defendant's ve-
hicle ; that the point of impact occurred in the middle of 
the intersection or barely over the center line of the inter-
section; that the road was clear and dry except for the ice 
on which plaintiff skidded. 
Defendant and respondent presented the following ad-
ditional facts: That defendant's driver stopped at the stop 
sign and, because of the building obstructing his view to 
the south, proceeded forward at a slow rate and again 
stopped slightly beyond the property line to look for on-
coming traffic and then proceeded into the intersection at 
a slow rate of speed-barely moving according to plaintiff 
(R. 8) or not more than 3 to 4 miles per hour. Defendant 
stated that the driver may not have stopped at the stop 
sign first as the view to the south was obstructed, but if 
he did not, he did stop slightly beyond the property line 
where he could observe the traffic on Main Street. At the 
time of the impact, Lambert had stopped or was proceeding 
to stop his car and the impact occurred in the southwest 
quadrant of the intersection, that is, in the south bound 
traffic lanes on Main Street. 
Hased on these facts, the trial court dismissed the case. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ADMITTED 
FACTS FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFEN-
DANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND, FURTHER, 
SAID FACTS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT, THAT NONE 
OF THE ACTS OF DEFENDANT PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT, AND 
THAT THERE WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE AC-
CIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ADMITTED 
FACTS FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFEN-
DANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND, FURTHER, 
SAID FACTS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT, THAT NONE 
OF THE ACTS OF DEFENDANT PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT, AND 
THAT THERE WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE AC-
CIDENT. 
It is the position of respondent that the facts presented 
as above set forth are insufficient to state a cause of action 
against defendant and that no reasonable juror could con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
elude on such facts that defendant was in any way liable 
to plaintiff. 
An intersection accident is involved here. The evidence 
is uncontradicted that defendant's driver( Lambert stopped 
before entering the intersection (R. 7, 10, 11) and that he 
was in the intersection at a time when plaintiff was more 
than 90 feet from the intersection (R. 7). Having stopped 
before entering the intersection, Lambert was entitled to 
proceed into the intersection and plaintiff was required to 
yield the right-of-way to him. 41-6-74 (a), U. C. A. 1953; 
Sn~ith v. Lenzi, 7 4 Utah 362, 279 P. 893; Hickock v. Skinner, 
113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514. True, Lambert could not project 
himself into a position of danger where there was an im-
mediate hazard of collision, but there is no evidence here 
that he did so nor was any such evidence offered. When 
Lambert entered the intersection, plaintiff was more than 
ninety feet away (plaintiff stated when he saw defendant 
that defendant was in the intersection and plaintiff \vas 
then 90 feet away (R. 7). Defendant did not race across 
the intersection into the lane in which plaintiff was travel-
ing in order to get across first as was the case in Bullock v. 
Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350, but proceeded slowly and 
cautiously at not more than three to four miles an hour or 
barely moving as stated by plaintiff (R. 8). As is the case 
with most motorists, Lambert apparently believed in giving 
police cars a wide berth. The Highway Patrol car was 
traveling in the outside lane on the opposite side of the 
street from defendant's vehicle and Lambert was entitled 
to assume that he would stay there. Surely, he cannot be 
charged with knowing that plaintiff would slam on his 
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brakes, hit some ice and spin from one lane to another. 
Indeed, since the impact occurred in the southwest quadrant 
of the intersection or (giving plaintiff the benefit of the 
doubt) in the center of the intersection or barely east of 
the center (R. 10) and defendant had stopped or was stop-
ping at the time (R. 7), it appears that defendant was pre-
pared to let plaintiff pass on the outside lane before pro-
ceeding further across the intersection. 
Plaintiff argues that there is no definite evidence that 
defendant's driver stopped before entering the intersection, 
but apparently the statements at Page 11 of the Record were 
overlooked: 
"He [Lambert] either stopped at the stop sign 
first and then stopped again slightly beyond the 
property line, or he stopped slightly beyond the 
property line without first stopping at the stop 
sign." 
We may concede that defendant's obligation to stop 
before entering the intersection required him to stop at a 
point where he could observe the traffic yet the record 
shows that this was done (R. 11, 7, 10). 
Coming now to plaintiff's actions, he was proceeding, 
according to his own statement, at 30 to 35 miles per hour. 
This is in excess of the speed limit established by Sec. 41-
6-46(b) (2), U. C. A. 1953. Since there is no evidence of 
unusual circumstances or a higher speed limit lawfully 
created by proper authorities, this speed constitutes negli-
gence on the part of Patrolman Wright as a matter of law. 
Jensen v. Utah Light & Rwy. Co., 42 Utah 415, 132 P. 8. 
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Finally, even, assuming plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent, at most the evidence shows that the accident was 
unavoidable. As has been pointed out previously, the High-
way Patrol car was traveling in the outside lane. In the 
ordinary course of events, Patrolman Wright would and 
should have stayed in that lane especially after observing 
Lambert coming from the opposite side of the street. But, 
when he put on his brakes, he ran onto an icy stretch of 
paven1ent and the car spun away from the outside lane and 
at least to the center of the roadway where the impact oc-
curred. Had the patrol car not spun on the ice, it would 
have passed defendant without any collision. Defendant at 
the time was stopped or stopping in the center as plaintiff 
states or on the west side of the road as defendant states. 
In either event, the patrol car in the easternmost lane would 
have passed by without incident had it not been for the spin 
on the ice, ice which according to the evidence neither party 
could have foreseen. But for the skid propelling the patrol 
car out of the outside lane, there would have been no acci-
dent. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we contend the judgment 
of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. R. WALDO, JR., 
of Ray, Rawlins, Jones & 
Henderson, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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